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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
matter pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(c) Replacement 
Volume 9, 1987 Ed., and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appeal followed a jury verdict in Washington County Fifth 
Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 881001374, finding Appellant 
guilty of violating Sees. 2a(1) and (2) of the St. George City 
Obscenity Ordinance (2-77-2), a Class B misdemeanor. Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss was denied on March 28, 1989, and Appellant's 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was denied by this Court on 
April 24, 1989. The case was tried October 3, 1989; Appellant's 
Motion for a Directed Verdict at the close of the City's case was 
denied; sentencing has not taken place. 
1 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Whether a small merchant can properly adorn the walls of his 
shopf located in a neighborhood near a high school, with drawings 
of a naked woman with her legs spread so as to expose her 
genitals and a woman's vagina, together with several titles and 
phrases, among other unrelated drawings and writings, under the 
protection of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Specifically, the questions raised are: 
1. Whether the St. George obscenity ordinance is 
unconstitutional because it is over broad and proscribes material 
that is not "obscene" under the Miller test. 
2. Whether the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied 
because the shop's wall adornment has a "dominant theme" and is 
not sufficiently offensive to pass a threshold test of obscenity. 
3. Whether the City bore its burden of proof so as to 
permit the matter to be properly presented to a jury. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
The St. George City obscenity ordinance stating 
a. No person shall knowingly: 
(1) distribute, display publicly, furnish or provide 
to any person any obscene material or performance; 
or 
(2) prepare, publish, print, create, advertise or 
possess any obscene material or performance; or 
must not be violative of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the government for redress of grievances. 
or Article 1, Sec. 15 of the Constitution of the State of Utah: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press . . . 
when it defines obscenity in the following manner: 
a. "Obscene" is a word descriptive of any material or 
performance which, when taken as a whole and considered in the 
context of the contemporary standard of this community: 
(1) Appeals to the prurient interest in sex; 
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner; 
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value. 
and sexual conduct, in pertinent part, as follows: 
e. "Sexual conduct" includes any of the following described 
forms of sexual conduct if depicted or described in a patently 
offensive way: 
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory functions or lewd 
exhibition of the genitals, including any explicit 
close-up representation of a human genital organ or a 
spread eagle exposire of female genital organs. 
3 
STATEMENT 
1. The Defendant operated a retail establishment vending 
hard rock music albums and T-shirts to the public from a small 
signless store open during evening hours only. The complex where 
it was located is on the access road to a high school three 
blocks away. The Defendant was cited for utilizing an obscene 
display as a part of wall hangings visible to anyone entering the 
door of the shop. 
2. The wall hangings, characterized by the trial judge as a 
collage of assorted themes, contained a drawing (apparently with 
spray paint) of a nude female lying on her back with her legs 
spread so as to display pubic hair and genitalia. Alongside is a 
large colored depiction of a vagina. Juxtaposed around the 
sketches are phrases such as "tuna factory", "eat me", "eat it", 
and "tunnel of love". Other representations sketched onto the 
wall hanging depict varied themes suggesting possibly politics 
(with anti-social and anti-nuclear slogans), religion (with devil 
worship symbols) and music (with album titles) , among oth€>r 
things. Significant analysis of any other themes was not 
undertaken at the trial. 
3. Evidence was introduced by the Respondent to show the 
wall adornment displayed to the public, the presence of customers 
including student-age individuals, Appellants relationship to 
the shop and its display, and a determination by police officers 
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that a violation of the obscenity ordinance existed. The 
Appellant put on evidence of the availability of materials in the 
community that would apparently violate the City/s obscenity 
ordinance, and testimony that the wall decorations had political 
and perhaps artistic value. The wall hangings were placed in 
evidence and spread on the floor of the courtroom for viewing by 
the jury. 
4. The jury was instructed to apply the Miller test to the 
work in question, in a context of contemporary community 
standards, and it returned a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT: SUMMARY 
First, the ordinance is not unconstitutional. The core of 
the ordinance is a definition of "obscene" in Sec. 1(a), and that 
definition faithfully tracks the definition provided in Miller v. 
California, 413 US 15 at 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 at 
431. To avoid vagueness, the ordinance proceeds to further 
define words used in that definition; Appellant urges that one 
of these further definitions causes the ordinance to become over-
broad rather than further narrowing the ordinance as was intended 
by the Respondent. Specifically, the definition of "sexual 
conduct" as encompassing a "lewd exhibition of the genitals, 
including any explicit close-up representation of a human genital 
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organ or a spread-eagle exposure of female genital organs" (Sec. 
1(e)(2)) seems to the be offending portion of the ordinance. 
However, that language is equivalent to the "lewd exhibition of 
the genitals" which is specifically mentioned in Miller as an 
example of the type of sexual conduct that can properly be 
considered obscene. The addition of those words creates a 
tighter, not broader, ordinance which is constitutional within 
the clear meaning of the cases. 
Second, application of the ordinance to the wall hanging in 
question is constitutional and appropriate. The total wall 
hanging, comprising three bed sheets, is a collage or assortment 
of various themes with nothing dominant, neither sexual nor 
political. However, the portion of the wall-hanging where a 
semi-recumbent female figure spreads her legs to show her 
genitals with the blown-up representation of a vagina alongside, 
in the context of the surrounding written material, have a sole 
theme - sexual conduct that fits within the definition of 
"obscene" contained in the ordinance. At trial, Appellant was 
unable either to minimize the sexual theme in that portion of the 
wall-covering or to establish a single, different theme for the 
wall-covering as a whole. Different artists were involved, and 
each section of the bed sheets must be looked upon individually 
in the same way as a painting in a gallery or a magazine in a 
bookstore. 
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Third, the Respondent met its burden of proof. The City 
introduced evidence of the offending material and through the 
scrutiny of its officers characterized it as obscene within the 
definition of the ordinance. When the Appellant sought to show 
that there was serious political or artistic value, the 
Respondent called a further witness to rebut that effort. The 
evidence introduced by Respondent was sufficient to cause the 
court to doubt the existence of any serious political or artistic 
value, and it allowed the case to go to the jury; the evidence 
was sufficient for the jury to apply a coiamunity standard and 
determine that the work was intended to appeal to the prurient 
interest and that it depicted sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way. There is no burden on the Respondent to introduce 
expert testimony of the community standard or extensive evidence 
beyond the offending material itself. 
ARGUMENT: ELABORATION 
1. Constitutionality of Ordinance. In his statement of 
issues presented for review, the Appellant requests that the 
ordinance be examined for both over-breadth and vagueness. 
However, his argument seems to be directed primarily at the 
breadth of material brought within the definition of obscenity by 
the ordinance, urging that sexual conduct must necessarily 
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involve "sexual action", and the mere spreading of legs in a lewd 
manner so as to expose the genitals is not sufficient to 
constitute obscenity. 
a. It should be established initially that the three-part 
test adopted by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California, supra, 
is the acceptable definition for obscenity now utilized by all 
courts. Appellant is fond of the word "hard core" and uses it 
over 20 times in his brief, but there is no accepted court 
definition of "hard core". Rather, it is an easy way to refer to 
materials meeting the Miller test, and it is appropriately 
referred to by Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 US 184 at 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, as a "shorthand 
description". The Ninth Circuit correctly notes that the "courts 
have insisted that the Miller guidelines be followed without 
deviation". J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry* 725 F.2d 482 
at 489 (1984) . *1 Those guidelines are utilized by the ordinance 
in question and provide the only standard recognized in this 
argument. 
*1 Rigid adherence, however, is not intended to prevent the 
Respondent from further defining or elaborating on the definition 
within the guidelines it sets; in Hamlinq v. United States, 418 
US 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 at 619 it is pointed out 
that the Miller case was not intended as a "legislative drafting 
handbook". 
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b. The Respondent's ordinance properly incorporates and 
applies the Miller tests. The kinds of sexual conduct made 
"patently offensive" are those types of conduct suggested 
by the "plain examples" given in Miller. One of the two examples 
given there includes a "lewd exhibition of the genitals". 413 US 
at 25, 37 L.Ed.2d at 431. See also Smith v. United States, 431 
US 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 at 335. To so display 
one's genitals is to engage in "conduct" of the type referred to 
in Miller, and a depiction of that type can properly be 
considered obscene. No case since Miller has held a lewd display 
of genitals to not be obscene. It should also be remembered that 
the Miller tests are applied at all times in the context of 
"community standards", *2 and while lewd exposure of the genitals 
may not be considered obscene by one community standard, the 
Respondent's ordinance is entitled to incorporate that particular 
criteria into the matter to which the community standard is 
applied. 
c. To find Respondent's ordinance not overly broad for 
purposes of the Miller test is not to render it vague at the same 
time. The danger that court construction to narrow the ordinance 
*2 The Miller case is even characterized by the court in Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 986 at 994 (Dist. Utah 
1982) as "the Community standards7 case". 
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may in turn make it vague, discussed by Prof. Tribe and cited by 
Appellant in Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. at 
998, does not exist here. As in the case of Smith v. United 
States, 431 US 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 at 340, dealing 
with the question of unconstitutional vagueness, the Respondent's 
construction of the St. George ordinance "flows directly from the 
decisions in Hamling, Miller, Reidel, and Roth. As construed in 
Hamling, the type of conduct covered by the (ordinance) can be 
ascertained with sufficient ease to avoid due process pitfalls," 
and is therefore constitutional. 
d. By citing other instances where a display of genitals 
has not been found to be obscene, Appellant may be attempting to 
have the ordinance declared unconstitutional because of 
overbreadth that threatens others not before the court (as in 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed 1093). If 
that is the case, Appellant "lacks standing to attack the 
constitutionality of the ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine 
because he has not shown a 'real and substantial7 abridgment of 
other innocent third persons' First Amendment rights." Provo 
City Corporation v. Willden, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1989) . There 
has been no evidence of potential injury to third parties, and 
Appellant's arguments should be limited to the effect of the 
ordinance upon him. 
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e. If there were in fact an overbreadth aspect to the St. 
George ordinance, the ordinance is readily susceptible to 
narrowing (partial invalidation) . Total invalidation is not 
favored. In a case where partial invalidation was found to be a 
proper remedy, Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326 at 1335 (9th 
Cir. 1987), Judge Wallace stated: 
"Use of first amendment overbreadth doctrine to 
invalidate a statute on its face is 'strong medicine.7 
New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 
3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). The remedy of total 
invalidation is generally reserved for cases in 
which the individual's own speech or expressive 
conduct may validly be prohibited or sanctioned, 
because the statute also threatens others not before 
the court who desire to engage in protected expression 
but who may be deterred from doing so. Spokane Arcades, 
472 US at 503, 105 S.Ct. at 2802. In such cases, the 
challenged statute must be 'substantially' overbroad 
in relation to its legitimate reach. Id. at 503 n. 12, 
105 S.Ct. at 2802 n. 12." 
See also Home Box Office v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 986 at 991; 
Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 
L.Ed.2d 125 at 135; and State v. Haiq, 578 P.2d 837 at 841 (Utah 
1978) . 
The court should be even less prone to find an ordinance 
unconstitutional for overbreadth where conduct is involved as 
well as speech. "When conduct plus speech is involved, the 
overbreadth must be 'real' and 'substantial' in relation to an 
ordinance before it can be declared invalid on its face." Upper 
Midwest Book Sellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 at 
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1391 (8th Cir. 1985) . As in the case of the Minneapolis 
ordinance, the St. George ordinance relates to both conduct and 
speech because it regulates the manner in which certain speech 
may be disseminated. The ordinance is not substantially 
overbroad and should not be facially invalidated. 
f. The Appellant bears the burden of showing the 
unconstitutionality of the Respondent's ordinance. This is 
discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in Provo City Corp. v. 
Willden, supra, citing Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 
1037 (Utah 1975), cert, denied, 425 US 915, 96 S.Ct. 1514, 47 
L.Ed.2d 766 (1976): 
"The defendant attacked the constitutionality of the 
ordinance by contending that its wording was over-
broad and vague. 541 P.2d at 103 6. We held that the 
party alleging the unconstitutionality of an ordinance 
or statute must overcome three hurdles, as follows: 
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed to be 
valid and in conformity with the constitution; 
(b) (The statute or ordinance) should not be held 
to be invalid unless it is shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some 
particular constitutional provision; and 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity of an 
ordinance or statute is upon the one who 
makes the challenge. 
541 P.2d at 1037 (footnotes omitted)." 
The Appellant has not borne the burden of proving the ordinance 
unconstitutional. 
2. Constitutional Application of the Ordinance in This 
Case. The subject matter to which the ordinance was applied was 
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obscene within the definition of that ordinance, and the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in submitting the matter to a 
jury for application of the community standard. The depictions 
in question (Transcript, pp. 144 and 194) are not "simple nudity" 
or "nudity alone", as referenced in Appellant's brief; the 
Defendant himself described one of the depictions as "a very 
enlarged portion of the girl's pubic area" (Transcript, p. 227) 
and states that the "tunnel of love" represents "a girl's 
vagina" (Transcript, pp. 228-229). 
a. There is a misconception that to be obscene something 
must necessarily be sexy or erotic. A City police officer 
testified that perhaps the word "prurient" was to be applied only 
to something that sexually excites him, and the Appellant seeks 
to perpetuate that error. It is not necessary for the ordinance 
to define "prurient interest", *3 and it is amply treated and 
defined by various cases. *4 The depictions on the bed sheet are 
*3 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. (1985), 472 US 491, 503 n. 
13, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2803 n. 13, 86 L.Ed.2d 394, 407 n. 13; 
People v. Sequoia Books, Inc.. 513 N.E.2d 1154 (111. App. 2 Dist. 
1987) . 
*4 e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.. supra; Polykoff v. 
Collins, supra. The definition not only includes a morbid or 
curious interest in sex, but even such non-sexual things as 
excretion. Even Justice Brennan agrees that if materials are 
denied First Amendment protection because they are "patently 
offensive" to the average citizen, "the element of erotic appeal" 
may not be important. Smith v. United States. 431 US 291 at 430, 
n. 20, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 at 347, n. 20. Sexual 
arousal need not necessarily be a dimension of the material to 
which an obscenity ordinance is properly applied. 
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lewd, and they may or may not be considered erotic by the 
beholder, but they can be obscene either way. 
b. The Appellant seeks by other decisions involving 
different materials to catalog specific depictions into obscene 
or non-obscene categories on an overall basis rather than to 
permit a customized application of the Miller test in each case. 
He would urge, for example, that if a display of genitals in a 
magazine sold in New York was held not to be obscene, any display 
of genitals, therefore, should be categorized as non-obscene. 
This approach not only negates the application of community 
standards, but it poses inherent dangers. For example, in United 
States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1974) the court 
emphasizes that "it is important to realize that 'slight' 
variations in format may well produce vastly different 
consequences in obscenity determinations." To determine the 
"prurient interest" and "patently offensive" prongs of the Miller 
test by using a yardstick of "comparable" materials from another 
context is to oversimplify; the jury verdict must have the right 
to decide whether it is reasonable to find the specific material 
in this case to be obscene in the context where it was found. 
Hamlina v. United States, 418 US 87 at 104, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 
L.Ed.2d 590 at 613 recognizes a close analogy between the 
function of "contemporary community standard" in obscenity cases 
and "reasonableness" in other cases. What may have been 
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considered non-obscene by another court does not make it 
unreasonable for the jury to find related material obscene in 
this case. While a verdict is clearly reviewable for sufficiency 
and compliance with the Miller limitations, jurors should not 
normally be reversed when they decide a question of obscenity "in 
accordance with their own understanding of the tolerance of the 
average person in their community." Smith v. United States, 
supra. 
c. The evidence showed that the Appellant's shop was 
patronized by juveniles (Transcript, pp. 23 6 and 121). The cases 
recognize that a municipality can adopt more stringent controls 
on materials available to youths than on those available to 
adults. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 
L.Ed.2d 195 (1968); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US 
205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125. Indeed, the Supreme Court of 
Utah in State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (1978) has recognized that 
the opinion in Miller "was predicated on the theory the State had 
a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition 
of obscene materials when the mode of dissemination carried with 
it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of 
unwilling recipients, or exposure to juveniles." The ordinance 
in question does not set a different standard for juveniles, but 
in applying that ordinance to the facts, the court and jury had a 
right to consider the manner in which the material was 
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communicated and to whom it was communicated. They are entitled 
to evaluate the context in which the Miller test (including the 
community standard) is to be applied. Even Justice Brennan in 
his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 US 49 at 84, 93 
S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 at 473 recognizes that "the obscenity 
of any particular item may depend upon nuances of presentation 
and the context of its dissemination", further indicating 
specifically that "distribution to juveniles" has a bearing "upon 
the determination of obscenity." 
d. If the wall hangings had a dominant theme, and that 
dominant theme were political or artistic, the trial judge may 
have appropriately found that the third prong of the Miller test 
was not met and denied submission of the case to a jury. 
However, the judge found that the sum total of the bedsheets was 
a collage, "a whole group of unrelated things that happened to be 
juxtaposed next to one another". At page 207 of the Transcript 
he states: 
" . . . since there appears to me to not be an overriding 
theme in these banners or these bed sheets, I think we 
can look at each part individually." 
The court was correct in treating the wall hanging as divisible 
into sub-works rather than treating the entire decoration as a 
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single work, particularly since he determined after a review of 
the various parts that there was not a dominant theme. 
e. It may be well to note here that the ordinance was not 
applied to suppress First Amendment items, it rather was applied 
to regulate the manner of display of the materials in question. 
That is significant in applying the Miller reference to taking 
the work "as a whole", as that phrase is intended to apply in a 
setting of suppression, not regulation. Books and magazines for 
sale that are "plainly divisible" into separate parts nonetheless 
may be considered as a whole for purposes of determining 
obscenity; that is not true where one deals with the display of 
objectionable materials. Regulation of display can challenge or 
excise a particular picture or portion of a total display without 
violating the integrity of the whole as a single creative unit. 
The display as a whole is not being suppressed; regulation 
affects only a readily divisible segment. Upper Midwest 
Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, supra, at 1393, 1394. The 
court there correctly concludes that the "as a whole" requirement 
does not prevent the City from regulating the manner of display 
of the offensive materials. The portion of the total display 
challenged here does not receive any "serious value" from the 
other sketchings with which it is associated on the bed sheets; 
the various parts of a display do not merge to constitute an 
inviolate "whole work" as in the case of a book for sale. 
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f. * Even if the bed sheets were taken as a whole, there is 
no dominant theme. The Appellant tried to suffuse the offensive 
depictions with a political message by testifying at trial that 
the "whole depiction was supposed to be political in nature, more 
or less, towards (sic) girls to not be a tramp or a whore", and 
"for guys to watch out for girls like that" (Transcript, p. 228) . 
In the language of Chief Justice Burger, the Appellant's efforts 
to show a dominant political theme partake of "the fallacy of 
seeking to use the First Amendment as a cloak for obviously 
unlawful public sexual conduct by the diaphanous device of 
attributing protected expressive attributes to that conduct." 
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. , 478 US 697 at 705, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 
92 L.Ed. 2d 568 at 577. The same is true of any effort to 
establish an artistic theme as dominant. The Appellant called an 
artist as an expert witness, but apparently not daring to ask him 
if the depiction was "artistic", he asked him if it were 
political *5 (Transcript, p. 285). This witness characterized 
the work as graffiti, stating that a number of critics, but not 
all critics, find graffiti to be a legitimate medium "for the use 
of making art work" (Transcript, p. 284). This is the closest he 
comes to calling the work "art", and it does not establish a 
*5 It was interesting to learn that the art expert found no 
formal political statements within the context presented. 
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ilomine artist -neire. Respondent'- ^r4- expert testified trial' 
the eira, .
 } * r* . * ' - i * Transcript, p :,<.'< ) 
Respondents Burden or , ; Respondent has met 
introducing rh« offensive materials I;01/ 
examinatK -. anu linking the Appellant t 
them as their sponsor. 
Prominent jurists J D the nast have referred '" 
pornography 1 \,IMJ •  1 " L, nov * when I see it"1, 
and "i t can and does speax for itsnii "i ^ 1..= Aaui „ neati * 
v. Slat 011,,, supra, 413 US at 56, the court stated: 
"Nor was it error to fail to require 'expert' 
affirmative evidence that the materials were 
obscene when the materials themselves were 
actually placed in evidence. United States v. 
Groner, 479 F2d 577, 579-586, (CA5 1973); id., 
at 586-588 (Ainsworth, J., concurring); id., 
586-589 (Clark, J., concurring); United States 
v. Wild, 422 F2d 34, 35-36 (CA2 1969), cert 
denied, 402 US 986, 29 L.Ed.2d 152, 91 S.Ct. 
1644 (1971); Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 
78, 84 (CA5), cert denied, 369 US 859, 8 L.Ed.2d 
1 8, 82 S.Ct. 949 (1962); State v. Amato. 49 
Wis 2d 638, 645, 183 NW2d 29, 32 (1971), cert 
denied sub nom Amato v. Wisconsin. 404 US 1063, 
30 L.Ed.2d 751, 92 S.Ct. 735 (1972). See Smith 
v. California. 361 US 147, 172, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, 
80 S.Ct. 215 (1959) (HarIan, I,, concurring and 
dissenting); Unites States v. Brown. 328 F.Supp. 
196, 199 (ED Va 1971). The films, obviously, are 
the best evidence of what they represent. 'In the 
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity 
questions since Roth, it has regarded the materials 
as sufficient in themselves for determination of the 
question.' Ginzbura v. United States. 383 US 463, 
465, i* T. Ed,2d 31, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966)." 
In note 6 on the same page the court elucidated further: , 
"This is not a subject that lends itself to the 
traditional use of expert testimony• Such 
testimony is usually admitted for the purpose of 
explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could 
not understand• Cf. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence Sections 
556, 559 (3d ed) (1940). No such assistance is 
needed by jurors in obscenity cases; indeed the 
'expert witness' practices employed in these cases 
have often made a mockery out of the otherwise sound 
concept of expert testimony, (cases omitted)11 
Certainly where a contemporary community standard is involved, a 
court cannot use the testimony of experts to overturn a jury 
verdict. It is recognized by the cases, and even by Justice 
Brennan in a dissent that the availability of materials in a 
community or the opinion of an expert about those materials may 
be typical of a minority only and need not conform to the 
community standard. Smith v. United States, supra, 431 US 291 at 
317, n. 14. As for establishing a lack of serious literary, 
political or artistic value, the work itself is sufficient for 
that purpose. Respondent should not be required to put on 
additional evidence to prove a negative. The only evidence the 
materials do not provide, in speaking for themselves, is 
information about the community standards by which they are to be 
judged; the Respondent is not constitutionally required to 
introduce evidence of those standards. Hamlina v. United States, 
supra, 418 US 807 at 104. As pointed out in U.S. v. Various 
Articles of Obscene Merchandise. 709 F.2d 132 at 135 (1983), the 
trier of fact is free to decide that the materials introduced by 
20 
the government are Insufficient to sustain its otixat»i 'I | nijing 
that they .in. ubscene. Respondent by introducing' the materials 
In evidence and only calling i I i.ro i t'.ecj n«niihei" of witnesses ran 
i ho risk that the court or: jury won M so find. Hc*.%-. 
putting on m M- r'videncn^ it" did not fail its burden *o proof _ 
any wa>. 
This court, proper : > re*:-'- .. v questions *^ 
the evidence presenre i i " **> + *••*] within *\ • substantive 
Iunits crovidec 
determinate 
the jury, nor t:,< 
toun 
Miller, whethe*. • c ~t r* 
should • *v owever, o\err..;:. i 
'. v A i'-:* ' . - presented * 
anless 
As stated in Hamling v. United 
i:Ct r.! r;i 
rroneous. 
States, supra, 418 US at l.<M: 
"Petitioners also make a broad attack on the sufficiency 
of the evidence. The general rule of application is 
that "(t)he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there 
is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable 
to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United 
States, 315 US 60, 86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942)." 
The trial court properly determined 
byn1oin of proof. 
u its 
CONCLUSION 
The challenged ordinance defined obscenity and described 
offensive conduct within the parameters set our by Miller, and it 
is neither so broad that it infringes on important constitutional 
rights of free speech nor so vague that it in any way interferes 
with the due process available to an accused. As applied in this 
case, the ordinance would expose Appellant to prosecution for 
displaying two works (or subworks) that lewdly exhibit female 
genitalia. The Respondent's enforcement of the ordinance in this 
manner was not unreasonable and does not violate the constitution 
either of the United States or of the State of Utah (Appellant 
does not argue that there is any difference in their 
interpretation). Guilt under the ordinance as charged was 
properly presented to a jury by the trial judge after crossing an 
initial threshold that there was no clear and obvious political 
or artistic content of serious value, and that there was 
sufficient possibility of prurient interest and offensive conduct 
that it should be submitted to the jury. The Respondent met its. 
burden of proof by presenting evidence of the offending material 
to the jury for application by it of the contemporary community 
standard. There is no error in the proceedings below that would 
mandate a reversal by this court. 
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